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Evanescent Paradigms
For a Latin Americanist who is getting
on in years the shifts of paradigm by
which we construe our region of interest
have accelerated to a breathless pace.
Yet academic solemnity is such that
mounting chaos is presented as linear
advance toward more perfect knowledge.
It is as though university departments,
guilty of drunken driving, were
administering their own sobriety tests.
Think of what we've been through. In the
1940s and into the 1950s there was
agreement in all the Americas, except in
cranky socialist or fascist corners, on
some brand of liberal evolutionism. It
rested on sanguine assumptions about the
generative forces of industrialization and
the stabilizing influence of a literate
middle class having a stake in a modern
economic order. By the mid-5Os it
appeared that international capitalism
was not wholly beneficent. One began to
hear that it had sinister, imperialist
features and that to countervail them the
client countries required centralized
planning and "structural" change to
correct for cultural differences and a
built-in economic handicap. As the plot
thickened, the horizons of the early 60s
clouded over. Secular determinisms came
to the fore: entrenched elites who were
cooptative rather than self-renewing or
circulatory; permanent disadvantage in
world markets; an international system
that was predatory as well as
asymmetrical; internal colonialism that
had persisted since the sixteenth century
or perhaps, in Mexico and Peru, the
fourteenth. At this point the Cuban
Revolution became a fascinating example
of (however one interprets it) charismatic
extrication or heterodoxy by external
subsidy.
In the late 60s and early 70s the worst
fears were realized. Revolutionary
impulses were stubbed out. The military
shed their disguise as modernizing
technocrats and intervened to erect a
state apparatus that was, in the social-
science euphemism, frankly
"exclusionary" with respect to popular
strata. When the clips were down the
generals were not umpires but vampires.
Because this calamity affected countries
with prestigious academic cadres, their
"bureaucratic-authoritarian" model,
improvised overnight, became doctrine
for the whole region save for the
shopworn but still bothersome case of
Cuba, now left to specialized
Cubanologists. By the mid-70s it
appeared that the soldiers had bitten off
more than they could chew, that popular
suffering and indignation demanded
redress, and that elites were not
sufficiently monolithic and deferential
to pledge eternal allegiance to regimes
whose competence did not extend to
economics. By now, what's more, popular
uprisings in small Caribbean nations were
stealing the spotlight, laying under
question the diagnoses from privileged
academic vantage points. Blue-ribbon
analysts promptly supplied fresh models
for redemocratization in conference
papers, sometimes at the very moment
when their bureaucratic-authoritarian
treatises were monumentalized as books.
Paradigm shifts have clearly accelerated
beyond the safety margin. For if the
replacement frequency has shrunk to
quinquennial intervals, how can
paradigms ever be substantiated? Bear
in mind that graduate students are the
principal source of data for validating
theoretical flights of senior professors.
But if dissertations take eight years
from conception to divulgation, they
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will forever be documenting threadbare
propositions. The planned obsolescence
of capitalism triumphs in the academic
marketplace, and scholarship pours into
a perpetual black hole.
Latin America as a Civilization
Now it may be that experience outruns
our capacity to interpret it. But much
depends on what we mean by experience.
If we mean the familiar dilemmas posed
by sudden deficits or military
confrontations, then "policy" is ipso facto
reactive and improvised. Outcomes
depend on the skill, and above all wisdom
of those who devise it. If we mean a
large sea change in our spiritual condition,
there may be the occasional Kierkegaard
or Nietzsche who will detect it, but we
common mortals must live out the
experience before we can, generations
later, make out their Delphic meanings.
My concern here lies between these
extremes. I look for understandings that
can set manageable context for quotidian
events without invoking spiritual
absolutes.
My middle ground has Latin America for
its arena. Here the level of "policy"
concern presents dramatic contrasts
among Brazil, Cuba, and Chile while the
level of Nietzschean "spiritual" concern
tranquilly assimilates all of Latin America
to the Rest of the West. For the present
argument we simply assume Latin
America to be a civilization unto itself
with its own political culture. To identify
this culture would clarify the logics of
political action in the region along with
many conceptual confusions of the past
fifty (or two hundred) years. What's more,
if there's a chance that Latin America
may soon represent a world and not
simply a Third World condition, there is
added reason to think toward political
discourse of more fixity and universality.
We do not seek, that is, to hone local
definitions of state, person, and society
in Brazil or Mexico. We propose instead
that Brazilians and Mexicans drop the
prepositional phrase from such terms,
as Vitoria and Hobbes did.
This universalist aspiration was dear to
Latin American neo-Hegelians and
phenomenologists of the 1940s and
early 50s. Leopoldo Zea and his Mexican
colleagues sought in Mexican-ness
(lo mexicano) a concrete form of to
humano, valid for any person in this
situation: "Always concrete awareness of
a determined reality. Yesterday awareness
of European man, today of the
(hemispheric) American, in the future
awareness of every man in whatever
circumstance or situation." (MIRÓ
QUESADA, 1974, p. 222.) The
ecumenical impulse soon collided with
functionalist and Marxist orientations in
the 1950s and 60s, when a new generation
of social scientists like Florestan
Fernandes believed that "sociologists of
underdeveloped and dependent regions
should not compete with those from
research centers in the central nations.
Whe should focus our efforts on systematic
empirical research into the fundamental
problems of those regions (...); and as
for formal or systematic sociology, we
should limit ourselves to consuming,
wherever and whenever necessary, the
results of the work of those centers"
(FERNANDES, 1977, p. 195-6).
Zea, at this stage of his career, spoke
from a generous, highly eclectic Heglian
perspective and Fernandes from a less
generous but still eclectic Marxian one.
They in effect resurrected a grand
confrontation from nineteenth-century
Europe. If, however, Latin America is a
black sheep within the "Western" family
of nations, a dispute cast in such terms
illumines only fitfully the implicit themes
of its civilization. I suspected something
of the sort when, as part of my
self-education in the 1950s, I speculated
that a pre-Enlightenment Ibero-Catholic
heritage may broadly condition the Latin
American political agenda. The academic
establishment consigns this approach,
however, to a pigeonhole discreetly
labeled "the distinct tradition"
(WIARDA, 1982). North American
scholars shy away from so-called
historico-cultural explanations because
they elude empirical demonstration,
while Latin Americans, although more
hospitable to flights of fancy,
understandably chafe under what seems
the "dead hand" of an authoritarian and
archaic political culture.
The muddle arises because polemics over
Latin America's relation to the Modern
West are resolved by reference to
intellectual canons of the Modern West
itself,.whereas the case requires a global
perspective that allows us to see Western
"sciences" as culturally embedded. Louis
Dumont stretches our grasp when he
lumps world civilizations into those of
Homo Hierarchicus and Homo Aequalis
(DUMONT, 1977 and 1980)1. Like most
globalizer he makes no reference, so far
as I know, to Latin America. I therefore
venture to include it in the Hierarchicus
category, for it fits Dumont's broadest
generalizations about civilizations that
failed to share the "revolutions of values"
as it accelerated in seventeenth-century
Europe. Why the Ibero Atlantic world
desisted I try to explain elsewhere.
(MORSE, 1988) But we can dispense
with historical pedigrees if we are game
to accept Latin American civilization
tout court.
The impediment to historical
reconstruction is that Latin America is
not Japan, where a Dore or a Bellah
elegantly traces how Shinto, Confucian,
and other traditions are woven into
patterns favorable to the industrial ethic.
The successful outcome legitimates the
traditions. To elicit serious discussion
of Latin America's neoscholastic legacy is
more ticklish. One is politely suspected
of clerical or authoritarian sympathies.
Perhaps Liberation Theology will liberate
academic minds along with disinherited
peasants. But meanwhile Leopoldo Zea's
old complaint that Latin American
ideologists suffer historical myopia still
holds.
Non-Western ingredients of the Latin
American heritage of course yield
supplementary identifications with
Dumont's "hierarchical" civilizations.
But when these como to the fore as
indigenismo and négritude, they are
plucked from context and inserted into
alien Western categories of etnicity and
identity. To trace how the Amerindian
and African presence is in fact
interwoven with "creole" culture
strengthens our argument, as I will later
suggest. But for the moment let us
dispense with regional history and eat
what's on our plate.
The Western Revolution of Values
Dumont comes to his study of the
, revolution of values in the Christian
Occident from a scholarly career devoted
to the caste society of India. He now
turns the Indian "mirror" around to look
from a fresh angle at the mental
furnishings of the West2. India he
recognizes to be an extreme case and
wholly different from China or ancient
Greece. He also acknowledges Western
variations between, say, France and
Germany with respect to nationalism and
individualism. His trick is to define the
Western "revolution" so as to yield a
principle of discrimination for the West
and the Rest.
The two antitheses that support
Dumont's taxonomy are
hierarchy-egalitarianism and
holism-individualism. Hierarchy and
holism characterize most of the societies
the world has known. The modern West
is an aberrant case. Dumont freely admits
that his constructs fall in the shadow of
Maine and Tunnies. His reinterpretation,
however, differs in key respects. First, he
pluralizes both poles of the dichotomy.
Second, he implies no developmental
sequence; the "modern" pole is a
civilizational option, not an evolutionary
outcome. Third, he uses mirrors to
interpret the "modern" pole in terms of
the "traditional" rather than vice versa,
and he warmly invites complementary
versions of Homo Aequalis from
hierarchical cultures other than the
South Asian. Finally, the implications he
draws from the revolution of values are
not at all those of Maine, Tunnies, or
even Durkheim; and since implications
concern us, we may borrow taxonomy as
merely heuristic.
Briefly, Dumont contrasts society seen as
a whole (universitas) with society seen as
an association (societas). In one case the
norm is "order, tradition, orientation of
1
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each particular human being to the ends
prescribed for the society". Man here is a
social being, deriving his humanity from
society as a whole. In the other emphasis
falls on "the attributes, claims or welfare
of each individual human being
irrespective of his place in society"
The "individual" exists by and for
himself; society is at best a partnership,
at worst a burden or non-human fact
(DUMONT, 1971, p. 32). With the
ascendancy of individualism the link
between immovable wealth and power
over men is broken as movable wealth
becomes more coveted. "Wealth" attains
autonomous status with the momentus
consequence that relations between men
and things now overshadow those
between men and men. This made it
logical for the English to abolish slavery
in their colonies (long before the Spanish)
at the same time that they invited "free"
workers to sell their labor, and shorten
their lives, in the coal mines.
The transition from holism to
individualism is marked in the ideological
realm by the factoring out of politics and
economics from the complex:
politics-economics-religion-society. "This
separation of disciplines tended to hinder
the mind from noticing the faulty
presuppositions of any particular
discipline and to prevent it from adverting
to the lack of any coherent intellectual
synthesis of the philosophical and
theological disciplines." (MIDGLEY,
1983, p. 26.) Dumont follows this
development through five emblematic
figures: Quesnay, Locke, Mandeville,
Adam Smith, and Marx3. Here are some
highlights. With Locke individualism,
authenticated by property, displaces the
hierarchical ideal. Subordination recedes
as a social principle in favor of moral
obligation. With Mandeville even morals,
insofar as they prescribe altruistic action,
forfeit their claim on conduct. Because
private interests are deemed naturally
harmonious, the public good is to be
realized through actions not consciously
oriented toward it. Private vices may be
criminal, to be sure, but this becomes a
matter of law, not morality. Mandeville
takes us from a post-hierarchical society,
wherein persons internalize social order in
the form of moral rules, to an economic
system wherein each member defines his
conduct by self-interest or hedonism,
with society serving as a mere
harmonizing mechanism or invisible hand.
Kant acknowledges the divorce of norm
from fact with his categorical imperative,
while Bentham reduces morality to
utilitarian calculus. Meanwhile Adam
Smith has anointed economics in its
acession as queen of the sciences. All this,
by the early nineteenth century, leaves the
western fringe of Europe and the eastern
fringe of North America with a highly
eccentric construction of social life.
Marxism is the apparent refutation of this
revolution of values. If it failed to catch
fire in the Anglo Atlantic world and
swept Western Europe in largely
revisionist form, it nonetheless became
the lodestar of the Russian Revolution,
and it continues to bewitch the Third
World. But why did Russians need to
Russify and orientalize Marxism?
(BERDYAEV, 1960, p. 107). And why
was Peru's Mariátegui impelled to
mythicize the Marxian message, infusing
its scientism with the vitalist accents of
Sorel and Croce?4 The answer lies in
Dumont's exegesis of Marx's sociological
texts that weighs their contradictions
against the premises to which he was
ineluctably drawn. We cannot reproduce
the nuanced argument. To simplify, we
summarize three conclusions. First, Marx
celebrates the triumph of economism,
apotheosizing it from a privileged
discipline to a throne from which it
cannibalizes sociology, history, and
politics. It has passed from the status of
humble domestic to that of umbrageous
rival to that of abusive mother. Second,
Marx ultimately espouses individualism.
Revolution is to emancipate man as an
abstract, self-sufficient creature.
Although the possessive individualism of
classical liberals is of course pilloried, in
a future society social man will yield to
the release of individual interest and
Marx celebrates the
triumph of economism,
apotheosizing it from a
privileged discipline
to a throne from
which it cannibalizes
sociology, history, and
politics.
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capacity. Sociology recedes before the
primacy that Marx accords to the relation
of man and nature over that between man
and man. Third, Marx boldly accepted
to demythicize the foundations of social
life. If his writing drew forensic power
from suppressed Promethean and
Judeo-Christian eschatology, he refused
to follow British empiricists in their
mythic assumptions about "natural man"
and "social contracts"5. He claimed to
have erected his argument on scientific
bases, to have unmasked social reality,
and to have demonstrated that nothing is
what it (ideologically) seems. Economic
theory is pressed to demonstrate what
was hitherto an ethical norm.
This interpretation, emphasizing Marx's
economism, individualism, and scientism,
gives substance to Foucault's opinion
that Ricardo achieved a sharper "epistemic
break" than Marx, Marxism, he claims,
introduced no real discontinuity at a deep
level of knowledge. It fell heir to a
hospitable epistemology; it took to
nineteenth-century thought like a fish to
water. Its conflict with "bourgeois"
economics implied not a schismatic
recasting of history but mere angry
coexistence (SHERIDAN, 1980, p. 70-1).
If we accept for the moment that Latin
American societies show strong traces
of holism, and even if we favor Dumont's
judicious argument over Foucault's
flamboyant one, we can appreciate why
Marxism took so long to strike roots in
Latin America, why Mariátegui performed
such acrobatics to devise an indigenous
Marxism, and why, when neo-Marxisms
took the region by storm in the 1960s,
the storm was transient even though,
like any strong tempest, it changed the
mindscape.
What, then, had happened in Western
Europe? Economics (as queen) and
politics (as hand-maiden) were extracted
from the holistic complex leaving religion
and society, it appeared, impotent and
anecdotal. The pecking order that any
community requires was no longer
inferred from religion or natural law but
furnished by a calculus of naked power.
Hierarchy, now unthinkable, fades into
bleak, statistically determined social
stratification. The new human sciences
are ranged on a scale from hard to soft
that runs approximately:
economics-political science-sociology-
anthropology-history-philosophy-
literature and the arts. Humanities, or the
study of things human, brings up the rear.
Geography, perhaps made obsolete by jet
travel, instant communication, and
martial delivery systems, plays a spectral
role. Psychology, depending on its
practice, falls anywhere along the scale. If
it rips the veil from raw instinct it can
dethrone economics, and threatens to do
so in both totalitarian and consumerist
societies; if it contents itself with the idle
play of imagery it lapses back into the
humanities. Dumont is worth quoting at
length:
"More generally, political theory
stubbornly persists in identifying itself
with a theory of power, that is, mistaking
a minor problem for the basic one, which
lies in the relation between power and
values, or ideology. The moment
hierarchy is eliminated, subordination has
to be explained as the mechanical result
of interaction between individuals, and
authority degrades itself into power,
power into influence, and so on. It is
forgotten that this sort of question
appears only on a definite ideological
basis, namely, individualism: political
speculation has enclosed itself unawares
within the walls of modern ideology. Yet
recent history has afforded us an
imposing demonstration of the vacuity of
mere power — I mean the vain, if
devastating, attempt of the Nazis to base
power on itself alone." (DUMONT, 1977,
p. 10.)
If one examines the social-science course
offerings, or impositions, of an elite North
American university, one quickly spots
the bias toward power instead of context,
toward what is reductive, instrumental,
and systemic instead of nuanced,
relational, and culturally responsive. A
leading economics department may offer
only one one-quarter course on European
economic history having the chronological
scope to disclose how the discipline
itself won primacy in the revolution of
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values and how a cost-benefit analysis of
the feat might turn out. The bulk of
courses assume only benefits as they
briskly demonstrate the nuts and bolts
of control and management through
such topics and techniques as: accounting,
econometrics, commodity futures
markets, money and banking, financial
decisions, science and techonology,
development, population interactions,
marketing, linear programming, public
finance, fiscal policy, agricultural policy,
tax policy, trade policy, human resources,
business firms seen as a cooperative
"game", economics of medical care, mass
media, power and conflict in social
systems (treated as game theory), price
and allocation, monetary theory, labor
economics, energy modeling, equilibrium
analysis, and, to cover all bases, the
"economics of uncertainty''
(STANFORD, 1983, p. 339-58).
How would we translate this menu for a
Mexican or Brazilian peasant? Clearly
the curriculum magnetizes its apprentices
toward careers as programmers and
manipulators. It crowds out consideration
of Lockean "morality", not to mention
pre-Lockean holism. Not a single course
title includes even the word "democracy".
Much the same can be expected of
offerings in political science, with the
term "policy" again coming to the fore
(Ibid., p. 507-18). Students receive few
hints that what are passed off as diagnostic
tools are flying buttresses for an
ideological cathedral. Mastering the
secrets of sheer power presupposes
severe contraction of the field of vision
and, accordingly, proliferation of more
courses. The more that proteges specialize
in the arcana of control, the sharper their
alienation from the human condition.
The fate of Dickens' perplexed proletarian
Stephen Blackpool in Hard Times (1854),
for whom economics was "aw a muddle",
has gradually become that of society at
large:
"Deed we are in a muddle, sir (...).
Look how we live, an' wheer we live, an'
in what numbers, an' by what chances,
and wi' what sameness; and look how the
mills is awlus agoin', and how they never
works us no nigher to onny dis 'ant
object — 'ceptin awlus Death."
The Question of Ideology
At this point we grope for clues to the
nature of ideology; for if we assume
that Lockean or Marxian versions thereof
answer the special needs of Homo
Aequalis, it stands to reason that the
term requires overhaul if it is to mark
boundaries for common discourse
between the West and the Rest. In the
last century ideology was renovated from
conflict and compromise between elites
and dangerous classes within the bosom
of the West. This dialogue echoed
throughout the world but could not
easily take root, for it made eccentric
assumptions about state and society that
were coming to be shared by modernizing
elites, political economists, and factory
hands of the industrializing countries.
Elsewhere I address this issue of
ideological translatability by analyzing
why we associate a "school of economics''
with industrial Manchester of the last
century and a "school of sociology" with
industrial São Paulo of our own (MORSE,
1978, p. 7-34). In the first case,
consensual recognition of a national
community supported scientific diagnosis
and therapy. In the second, the very
existence of a national community was
questionable; diagnosis would require a
sociologically recognizable patient.
In what follows I apply the term ideology
to the beliefs and moral sentiments of
a community having a shared history and
not to an instrumental set of precepts and
policy norms that disguise partisan
interests. A hegemonic ideology may be
said to be the second type successfully
masquerading as the first. Those who
disparage ideology often do so by pitting
it against philosophy or science. Midgley
warns of a gulf between the thinker in
search of fundamental truth and the one
who chooses or imposes "values"
irrespective of their truth or falsity. The
inadvertence of ideology to philosophic
truth he attributes to the "intellectual
amnesia" of the post-Renaissance and
Reformation era. Abandonment of the
medieval philosophic synthesis in favor of
modernist and atheistic presuppositions,
he holds, has produced ideological
bondage in the moral, intellectual, and
spiritual domain from which the only
deliverance lies in "rejection of the entire
ideological enterprise as such"
(MIDGLEY, 1983, p. 159).
For the neo-Marxist committed to science,
ideology poses a more complex if less
overwhelming challenge. He must
acknowledge three versions of ideology:
first, a set of beliefs that justify the
interests of a group or class; second, a set
of illusory beliefs, or "false
consciousness", and third, "the general
process of the production of meanings
and ideas". The third and more neutral
version, necessary of course for validating
"socialist ideology", undercuts the first
two (WILLIAMS, 1977, p. 55-71). The
addition oí hegemony to neo-Marxist
vocabulary provided a kind of false
synthesis by associating ideology with
the production of ideas while suggesting
that class interest and false consciousness
might become hypostasized as a
civilizational commitment. The latter
occurs when the citizen's compliance is
experienced as participation under
systems wherein counterideologies and
interpellations are democratically yetted
and then run off to ground — thus
permitting, for example, a silent majority
to imagine itself to be a prepotent
plutocracy.
After I had composed a draft of these
thoughts I learned of Luis Villoro's
book on the concept of ideology
(VILLORO, 1985). I awaited it with
certain trepidation, for I knew that this
accomplished Mexican philosopher, with
his analytic skills and sensitivity to
historical process, might make my own
reflections superfluous. If, having now
read his adroit and lucid book, I find
this to be only partly so, it is also clear
that his argument is a necessary
antecedent and accompaniment to mine.
Villoro patiently defines the slippery
terms statement, attitude, belief, and
ideology. Applying both gnosiological
and sociological analysis, he retraces
the treatment of ideology by Marx &
Co. and mourns the paradoxical
ideologization of Marxism itself. Thinkers
who unmasked ideology so as to foster
rationality and liberation only codified,
he finds, a new instrument of domination.
"Between science and ideology", Villoro
asks, "is space left for philosophy?".
I am in admiring accord with Villoro's
mission to demystify received clusters of
philosophic thought and their subservience
to vested interest. I applaud his distinction
between the searching propositions of
philosophy that liberates and philosophic
codification that obscures and dominates.
I agree, as Marx in enlightened moments
insisted, that disruptive or liberating
thought is impotent if unlinked to social
transformation. What I resist accepting is
the lugubrious procession that Villoro
stages from philosophic speculation to
codified doctrine to political manipulation
to ideological control. "Unauthentic
culture", he concludes, "is ideological
culture".
As I see it, the accent of my argument
differs on two counts. First, I want to
rescue ideology, science, and philosophy
from each other without severing them.
The term "ideology" proposed by Destutt
de Tracy in 1801, is less venerable than
philosophy and science. Its ultimate
meaning, however, underlies theirs since
it has to do with cultural premises for
belief and praxis. Ideology is a neologism
that implies the commodification of
moral sentiments in our industrial age
just as entertainment implies
commodification of the arts, even
though art, as such, still endures. (Were
there no precedent for my neutral use
of ideology, I might have echoed Adam
Smith and called this chapter "Notes
toward a Theory of Moral Sentiments".)
Villoro assumes that codified philosophy
is doctrinal, an arsenal of muskets and
not a cupboard of passkeys. He
smoothly demonstrates (or alleges) that
"democracy", "Mexican Revolution",
and "socialism" are in the service,
respectively, of capitalism, dependent
underdevelopment, and Soviet
bureaucracy, that they became ideologies
of domination and not, as initially
promised, levers for libertation. For me,
philosophy and ideology may overlap or
interfuse but are not sequential phases.
In my usage they have different origins,
legitimations, and constituencies.
Our second difference, then, is that
Villoro treats ideology as an artifact or
artifice of intellectuals and publicists that
should pass through the needle's eye of
logic and evidence. I on the other hand
accept ideology as a societal product or
historical emanation where, given its
diverse sources, the challenge is not
validation but interpretation. At the
outset Villoro criticizes Mannheim's
capacious and "vague" treatment of
ideology as panideologism that collapses
into the sociology of knowledge,
whereas I take Mannheim as a transitional
prophet between Marx's era and our own
for whom analytic energies were yielding
to historical empathy that was, at the
time he wrote, necessarily more vague
than Marxism.
Mannheim reexamined the question of
ideology between the World Wars.
Rejecting a Eurocentric viewpoint and
avoiding distractive analogies with
philosophy and science, he set out a
series of illuminating clues on how to
reconceive ideology for a pluralistic world
(MANNHEIM, 1929). The anthropologist
Geertz cautions against a supposed
Mannheim's Paradox — to wit, that in
striving toward a "nonevaluative concept
of ideology" Mannheim resorted to
normative postulates and thence to "an
ethical and epistemological relativism"
he found uncomfortable (GEERTZ, 1973,
p. 193-233)6. Geertz himself, from his
ahistorical, functionalist position, sees
ideology and science as serving culture in
two neatly complementary roles, ideology
as its apologetic dimension and science as
its diagnostic one. He consigns ideology
to a justificatory, rhetorical function and
science to an executive one that connects
to "reality". My own view, more
consonant with Mannheim's, is that
ideology has its own executive force
when it comes to human "reality".
Science can in fact be considered to
depend on ideology for its imagery and
its agenda (although once ideology
canonizes science, it risks converting it to
scientism).
Dumont, whom I think of as Mannheim's
more self-assured sucessor, is categorical
on this point. He refuses to demote
ideology form the company of science,
philosophy, and other "reputable"
domains: "there is already too much of a
dovecote here". He locates the dilemma
Mannheim reexamined
the question of
ideology between the
World Wars. Rejecting
a Eurocentric viewpoint
and avoiding distractive
analogies with
philosophy and science,
he set out a series of
illuminating clues on
how to reconceive
ideology for a
pluralistic world.
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in the primal segregation of politics and
economics from religion and society.
For him ideology is not a residual
category that absorbs left-overs from
scientific and rational thought. It is not a
mask or opiate, nor is it, even in the
classic sense of the adjective, the
rhetorical mobilization of Geertz. It
delves to tacit premises, to the "grid
of consciousness", to "implicit
coordinates of common thought".
Rationality and science clarify linkages
between means and ends but cannot
hierarchize the ends. Even in a scientific
society science is not a referee but a
team player in the ideological world
series who breaks his collarbone like
anyone else. Scarcely any modern citizen
can demonstrate the heliocentric theory
and none is even aware of it when watching
a sunset. Neoscholastic Spaniards were
quite candid; they fended off the Toledo
blade of science simply by calling
heliocentrism a fiction useful for maritime
navigation. In our own day we expect the
most progressive teachers and students to
boo a Nobel laureate off the stage if he
dares adduce "hard" somatic evidence for
racial inequality. In the industrial West
society and religion (belief) wait patiently
on the sidelines, hoping for interstitial
entry into what Chauí calls the "lacunar"
or self-censored discourse of formal
ideology (CHAUÍ, 1982, p. 3-13). During
the Viet Nam War they waited well nigh
interminably for the policy resolution of
scientism (domino theory), individualism
(massacre of innocents), and economism
(tax burden and inflation). As we now see,
Viet Nam imparted no moral lesson to
the perpetrators.
Mannheim readdressed where Marx had
left it the discontinuity between ideology
as self-interest or false consciousness and
as a process of rendering meanings. The
former version had appeared with
individualization and rationalization.
The eighteenth-century businessman or
intellectual required grounds for rational
decision and freedom to think through
issues affecting his private interests.
This was not the case for peasants or
subordinate white-collar workers who had
little bent for initiative or speculative
foresight. As the religious world view
disintegrated, although without vanishing,
the absolute state asserted its political
conception of the world as a weapon,
based now on science rather than on
articles of faith. With democratization,
the task of fashioning a credo was
relegated to liberals, then to conservatives,
finally to socialists. All brands of
politics took a scientific tinge while
scientific attitudes assumed political
coloration. Unlike academic discussion,
political debate is not resolved on
theoretical grounds. It strains to lay
bare the motives of opponents, irrespective
of the theoretical plausibility of their
positions. Politicians aim to talk past
each other, thinkers to engage.
Mannheim's Paradox is not then, as
Geertz would have it, the stand-off
between science and subjectivism — for
the two are interfused — but a tension
between the particular and the general
which, as we will later see, were the terms
that Rousseau had used at his own critical
moment. Every moment in modern times
is of course critical. The minds that
interest us are those that experience theirs
as so being. Mannheim first published
Ideology and Utopia in 1929, a critical
year to be sure; yet he found his "era of
transition" laden with "antiquated
traditions and forms". He had to revert to
Hegel's acceptance of the Kantian
dissolution of the world existing
independently of mind and to the
assumption that the world's unity requires
a knowing subject. Mannheim, that is,
shouldered the burden of German
historicism.
Mannheim's pathology of nineteenth-
century Europe subtended a world arena.
He was troubled by the transition from
historical consciousness as such to
Volksgeist (still "too inconclusive") to the
doctrine of class idelogy. If this search
was for the center of an infinitely
variable world, it must fight shy of
mechanistic synthesis. The fictional unity
of "consciousness as such" must
accommodate the outlooks of epochs,
nations, and classes. Here Mannheim
moved toward a global calculus once he
had defined "particular" ideologies as a
disguise for real situations and "total"
ideologies as historic thought-systems
grounded in noological coordinates. The
latter contained yard-sticks to expose the
deceits of the former. Mannheim saw
around him a world in upheaval where
beliefs and attitudes and even their
intellectual foundations were under
question. He commended Marxist theory
for having fused particular and total
ideology, using class and economic
analysis to probe past a "psychological"
to the philosophic level. Yet even this
stage had passed, for socialists had lost
their exclusive franchise for decoding
bourgeois thought. Others could turn
the new weaponry against Marxism itself.
Weber, Sombart, and Troeltsch had
pioneered the more agile strategy, and
Mannheim quotes Weber's dictum that
the materialist view of history is not a
cab that one enters or alights from at will.
Reconciling particular and total ideology
led Mannheim to posit a new phase,
namely, the transition form the theory of
ideology to the sociology of knowledge.
Here the observer relaxes his grasp on
absolutes in an era of "intellectual
twilight" and recognizes that the meanings
of our world are historically determined
and continuously developing. In discarding
fixed ideological values, a term redolent
of the capitalist commodities market, we
enter a realm of uncertainty that is closer
to reality than were the absolutes of
earlier faiths. As in the exact sciences, the
uncertainty principle offers firmer
anchorage than does certainty. The
absolute, once a means of communing
with the divine, now camouflages
meanings of the present. We can read
history only through patterns rising from
flux Hence the anachronism of fixed
values. The content of thought matters
less than its categorical structure. A
modern theory of knowledge entails not
surrender to anarchic subjectivism, or
relativism, but a search for historical
understanding that is relational among
spheres of thought, given that absolutes
do not exist beyond incommensurable
human contexts7. The danger of false
consciousness is no longer that it fails to
grasp a given state of affairs but that it
lacks dialectical attunement to the
ceaseless reordering of mental processes
which compose our worlds.
While Mannheim derived his viewpoint
from history, he was aware that in his
"world of upheaval" it applied to
contemporary cultures not less than to
past epochs of his own tradition. From
this threshold between Eurocentrism and
pluricentrism he offered many clues,
often allusive to be sure, for the challenge
of ideological renewal in contemporary
Latin America.
Two classic studies of race relations in the
United States and Brazil help to exemplify
ideological issues thus far raised (HEATH,
1974, p. 490-1/DA MATTA, 1979,
p. 176)8. When Gunnar Myrdal and his
associates presented their studies on the
dilemma of blacks in the United States,
they introduced the central volume with a
statement of the American Creed against
which treatment of blacks might be
measured (MYRDAL, 1944, chap.l). This
Creed, they found, had sources in, first,
the ideology of the Protestant sects which
envisaged democracy in prepolitical,
ecclesiastical terms; second, the tradition
of English law that laid bases for liberty,
equality, and a government of laws rather
than of men; and third, the humanistic
liberalism of the Enlightenment and its
principles of the dignity and perfectibility
of man, a shared common weal, respect
for consent of the governed, and a notion
of liberty that was aggressively if loosely
defined and assumed to derive form
equality. This was perhaps the most
explicit set of social ideals of any Western
nation and the one most widely
understood and appreciated by its
citizenry. So compelling were its tenets
that even blacks were "under the spell of
the great national suggestion. With one
part of themselves they actually believe,
as do the whites, that the Creed is ruling
America". One could scarcely find a
clearer instance of ideological hegemony,
or conditioned acquiescence in the
precepts of a legitimized political order.
Myrdal's challenge was to explain racial
7
 On this point see Villoro's chapter on "Authenticity in Culture" in El concepto de ideología
(1985).
8 I have drawn the contrast in "The Claims of Tradition in Urban Latin America" in Dwight
B. Heath, ed., Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin America (1974). Roberto da
Malta notes it in Carnavais, malandros e heróis (1979).
discrimination, both legal and behavioral,
given the spell of the American Creed.
In the 1950s another European, Roger
Bastide, directed a set of comparable
studies on race relations in Brazil
(BASTIDE e FERNANDES, 1955)9. In
this case no attempt was made to
summarize a "Brazilian Creed" as a
yardstick for social behavior. This could
have been for several reasons. Perhaps in
Brazil discrimination against blacks was
not at a quantum jump from that against
other disinherited groups. Or perhaps the
researchers were being "realistic" in
discounting formal ideology. Or perhaps
they simply assumed the norms of a
generalized Western ethic (the study had
UNESCO sponsorship). Or perhaps, and
this is what my argument supposes, there
is no Brazilian Creed in the unitary sense
of Myrdal. In the United States the
imputation that a person or group is
un-American carries a clear set of
meanings, while in Brazil the term
un-Brazilian would be something of a
puzzle. If the term were coined, one
might imagine it signifying "patriotic"
respect for an authoritarian public order
or else "patriotic" disrespect for that
order; it might be applied to those who
undermine legal norms of equality or to
those who fail to exhibit the Brazilian
kanck, or jeito, or circumventing formal
codes. In short, the norm for being
Brazilian might be derived from an
exogenous constitutional criterion or
from an endogenous cultural one.
Brazilian society, Da Matta has said, is
one of multiple ethics. Here the liberal,
individualist Western ethic is an official
creed of legal equality that has no
popular recognition as a prevalent or
enforceable ideal. Private codes at all
social levels and informal cult groups,
sodalities, and festivals offer alternative
constructions of society, methods of
coping, assurances of community, and
therapeutic release. Here then, an
oppressive institutional order
whitewashed by individualist, egalitarian
ideology is complemented by a family
of subcommunities aspiring to an
egalitarianism that is personalist rather
than individualist and therefore consistent
with holism. The realm of popular
religiosity, in particular, represents "a
subsidiary system that is gradualist,
hierarchical, and compensatory: a system
possessing an enormous and clear
multiplicity of spheres, motivations, and
ideologies" (DA MATTA, 1981, p. 245).
Such a society classifies the single person
relationally in the shifting context of
his affiliations rather than atomistically
by precepts of a common Creed. In the
American case the Creed and the culture
are seen as conjoined; Brazilians see them
as unyoked.
How and when might ideology take form
in a society which is, in a radical sense,
more pluralist than a Western industrial
democracy? Must it await a moment
favorable for technocrats and charismatic
leaders to devise a self-legitimizing
regime? Does it require explosive and
consensual redifinition of the rules of the
game? Or is the society to fluctuate
indefinitely, as Da Matta suggests,
between quiescent periods when a logic
of social complementarity allows a vision
of the totality and episodes of crisis when
this logic collapses and the cosmic leader
is called in?
In addressing such questions, let us
brashly assume that the time is ripe
to start articulating ideology not for but
in Latin America. It is not to be cut from
whole cloth, nor cater to vested interests,
nor preempt an arc on the left-to-right
spectrum, nor address immediate policy
matters. It will reflect inexpugnable
historical contradictions whence it issues
and the contemporary world that it
faces. It will hierarchize aspirations in
conformance to demonstrable
circumstance and shared belief. We are
not talking of totalitarianism, a ludicrous
pretension to holism in egalitarian
societies that corrupts science and
manipulates history. (Cf. Thomas Mann's
Mario the Magician). Nor do we mean
populism (promises, promises,
promises...). We commence, as
ideological reconstruction must, with
commonsensical renewal of lexicon.
From the domain of society-and-religion
9
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(or experience-belief or anthropology -
philosophy or history-literature) we
fumigate, item by item, the whole
mystificatory terminology perpetrated
by economics and political science:
state, society, bureaucracy, class,
interest group, hegemony, power, control,
influence, management, decision-making,
policy, plans, programs, resources,
organization, allocation, distribution,
development, theory, models, education,
consensus, science, evidence, system,
equilibrium, causality, rationality, and
many more. Communities are not
machines, and privileged actors'are not
omnipotent nor even very competent
engineers. To conceive of societies as
systems of power that is rationally
exercisable without cultural or moral
constraint produces a world of
confrontation, terrorism, bulging
penitentiaries, and defense budgets of a
quarter of a trillion dollars. When expertise
governs, violence is the last resort, or alas,
sometimes the first. Machiavelli was right
to warn of the hand of fortune in human
affairs and Rousseau to insist on the
therapeutic force of a (perhaps inconstant)
general will. As was Foucault to invoke
an "insurrection" of minor historical
knowledges "against the institutions and
against effects of the knowledge and
power that invest scientific discourses"
(FOUCAULT, 1980, p, 87).
A Promising Conjuncture
Before surveying some possible contours
of fresh ideology, let me show why this is
a juncture for doing so. There are three
considerations. First, the domestic
situation. Ever since 1760, when a
cautious meshing of ancient
understandings to Enlightenment
discourse began occurring in Latin
America, large fissures have appeared in
national platforms for ideological renewal.
A horizontal fissure opens between the
cosmopolitan discourse of cities that
envisions a systemic construction of
society and an accommodative,
architectonic political culture that
prevails at grass roots and in the
psychology of every-day life. Vertical
fissures open among groups of ideological
innovators because for many reasons no
system seems to fit an architectonic
society. Hence the characteristically
politicist form of Latin American political
culture, where manifestoes, plans,
pronunciamientos, and garantías rally
support for charismatic leadership and,
as an afterthought, append standard
promises of social reform across the
political spectrum. The Mexican
Revolution is a familiar case. It was not
that revolutionary messages were
improvised and compromised, as happens
in any upheaval, but that there were no
common understandings with respect
to an elemental vocabulary and grammar
for ideology (FROST, 1972, p. 143-95).
These, as will later appear, are still lacking
in Mexico.
Two centuries of random crises and
arbitrary regimes never precluded meliorist
hopes pinned to evolution, enlightenment,
development, or simply a lucky cast of
the revolutionary dice. Today, however,
the future seems menacing and turbulent,
at worst apocalyptic and at best
inscrutable. Hence, the frenzied
acceleration of paradigm shifts reviewed at
the outset: kaleidoscopic nightmares of
the academic mind that too often become
waking dreams, as in Chile since the
1950s. Intellect becomes a loose cannon
on the deck. It has gained mass and
critical capacity. It is no longer a
patronized establishment content to
offer muted or encoded messages in lieu
of sketching bold alternatives. Conversely,
those who wield political power, often
less competent than their predecessors,
are losing authority to pacify intellect.
The new universities, conceived for
cooptation and technocratic recruitment,
are a Frankenstein's monster. They
command generous resources for
reimagining the polity and for
reconceiving history to yield a usable past.
Yet the new intellectual cadres cannot
aspire to impose ideology as the
pensadores once did. We no longer
require armchair conjectures about
natural men and social contracts. People
are now part of society, despite sadistic
protestations by social pathologists that
they are, by computerized indices, at its
margin. Glued to transistor radios, the
people know what's at stake. They are
in quotidian, dialectical confrontation
with authority. They discover that their
improvised sodalities for accommodation
and solace harbor assertive, renovative
force. If life is an opera, which the
Brazilian writer Machado de Assis
suggested it to be in chapter nine of
Dom Casmurro, they are no longer
supernumeraries but sing their own arias,
now audible over the familiar score from
the orchestra pit. (Note that Machado's
God composed the libretto, Satan the
music. "Indeed in some places the words
go to the right and the music to the
left. (...). There are obscure passages;
the maestro makes too much use of the
choral masses, which often drown out
the words with their confused harmony.")
The second conjunctural factor has to do
with dilemmas of the industrial world.
The metropolotian countries, alleged to
control Latin American destinies, are
internally threatened by economic
uncertainty and exhaustion of cultural
possibilities. Their life, hyperrationalized
and disenchanted, spouts symptoms of
paranoia and blind adventurism. Their
ideological arsenal fails to yield an
articulated polycentric scheme of the
world. If such is the plight of hegemonic
powers, Latin America is no longer an
ideological consumer but has messages for
the world. It requires its own ideological
delivery system.
That the old sureties are crumbling and
the future is murky makes the moment
ripe for an ambitious ideological project.
If one gets static on the TV tube, one
extends the antenna for distant stations.
The transmitters we might pick up are
the great European ideologists who wrote
at a time when ancient verities were in
collapse, new bases for conceiving society
were imperative, and to promulgate a
viable future was an act of sheer
intellectual fortitude. Yet we are not
simply to select a new configuration of
influences from great minds of the past.
Rather, we must attempt imaginative
reenactment of situations in which such
minds — Vitoria, Hobbes, Rousseau (to
whom we shall return), Hegel, et al. —
were thrown back on epistemological and
axiological foundations to reconceive the
polis. We quest not for propositions and
formulae but for Aristotle's imitation of
action. How does one revisualize society
at an existential moment? The grand
ideologists did so by looking to ancient
and medieval exemplars and by
cultivating an intuitive, anthropological
sense of immediate circumstance. The
ancients whom we look to are those
very Europeans who attended the birth
of the Western nations.
A third conjunctural factor deserves
lengthier consideration. One does not
invent ideology ex nihilo. Besides tuning
in distant stations and having rapport
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with immediate social circumstance, one
must join a domestic conversation that
has been framing the issues. An
Englishman in 1650 or a German in 1800
did not reach out blindly to yoke Aristotle,
Plato, Aquinas, and Machiavelli. He was
immersed in contemporary dialogue. In
Latin America such dialogue was
desultory for a century after
independence and often collapsed into
soliloquies. Different explanations exist.
Leopoldo Zea has claimed that New
World "pensadores" were victims of
futurism and failed to acknowledge and
assimilate their own history. A Gramscian
might propose that the artificiality and
social fragmentation of the new nations
precluded hegemonic ideologies.
Florestan Fernandes contrasts the original
bourgeoisie that created its own world
with the "peripheral" one that accepts
that world submissively and by diffusion.
Dumont might contend that Latin
America, if one accepts it as one of the
world's large family of holistic societies,
could never digest the individualist
ideologies of industrial Europe that had
become its principal diet. Whatever one's
mix of explanations, one may plausibly
suppose that the period was a lost
century for ideological reconstruction
when one compares outcomes in such
divergent cases as Russia and Japan.
Since the 1920s Latin American artists
and intellectuals have been more
successful in establishing cumulative
dialogue. To evoke this ongoing process
let us review several moments in the
career of Latin American mind and
sensibility in our century as reflected in
such realms as literature, the essay,
philosophy, and social science. This is
no definitive mapping but a personal
reconnaisance of openings toward what
are frequently called national reality and
cultural identity10.
Our first moment is the key to the rest,
for it demonstrates engagement with the
industrial West without mimicry. I refer
to Spanish American Vanguardism,
known in Brazil and Europe as
Modernism. In Europe Modernism had
early antecedents as an attitude both
critical and celebratory of modernization.
One might call it a cognitive assault on
the contradicions of modernity. Not
until its golden age of 1910-30, however,
did Modernism, from its Parisian arena,
make its impact on Latin America. At
this point Europe experienced the crisis
of nerve associated with technification,
commodification, alienation, and
rampant violence, as these found
expression in neo-Marxian contradictions,
Spenglerian decadence, and Freudian
invasions of the subconscious. The Latin
American prise de conscience required
precisely this dissolution of evolutionary
and meliorist rationales. Europe now
offered pathologies and not simply
models. Disenchantment at the center
gave grounds for rehabilitation at the rim.
São Paulo was a predestined Modernist
center. Once the impoverished homeland
of Brazil's half-breed pathfinders
(bandeirantes), it had exploded as the
industrial capital of the continent. Here
young intellectuals were well positioned
to adopt Modernist technique and, in
their Brazilwood and Anthropophagy
manifestoes, to use it for encoding
messages directed to the metropolitan
countries. Having filled the pockets of
the capitalist West for centuries with
exports of brazilwood, gold, and coffee,
the time had come for Brazil to export
poetry, to enrich and pluralize Western
mind and sensibility. Anthropophagy
recalled the cannibalism of Brazil's first
natives, who neither rejected nor
mimicked European culture but
consumed its bearers to ingest their
magic powers. José Carlos Mariátegui,
a Peruvian contemporary of the Brazilian
Modernists and famous for his essays
interpreting his nation's "reality", is not
primarily remembered as a vanguardist.
Yet he was in fact a devotee of surrealism
which, by decomposing the solid
bourgeois world into absurd fragments,
showed him how to extract Marxism
from its positivist armature to give its
message mythic beyond merely scientific
force (NUNEZ, 1978, p. 69-87).
Mariátegui's Seven Essays (1928), like
Paulo Prado's Portrait of Brazil of the
10 The rest of this section draws on a chapter I am preparing for the Cambridge History or
Latin America.
same year, linked Modernism to the
national-character essayists of the 1930s.
Here was a genre that paid heed to
history, culture, philosophy, and
psychology and less to economics and
government, despite the world depression
and its political crises. Ezequiel Martinez
Estrada published his X-Ray of the
Pampas in 1933, at the threshold of
Argentina's infamous decade. Yet his
X-ray was not of sociogeographic reality
in Mariátegui's sense but of the Argentine
mind. The quest leads to cultural and
spiritual biography and, as it enters the
domain of psychoanalysis, suspends
historical time. The Argentine is an
orphan of tradition, condemned to
solitude, engrossed in a private self. Only
when the specters of the past are brought
to consciousness can they be exorcised
to allow Argentines to live together in
health. Germans from Schopenhauer and
Nietzsche to Scheler and Spengler marked
the cast of Martínez-Estrada's thought, as
did Ortega and Freud. In this he was akin
to Samuel Ramos, whose Profile of Man
and Culture in Mexico appeared in 1934.
Both men saw collective psychology as
the key to national therapy.
From the invertebrate subcontinent of
Brazil came a trio of books offering quite
divergent diagnoses 11. In The Masters
and the Slaves (1933) Gilberto Freyre
became a Freudian by private invention
in his search for archetypes that govern
behavior and institutions; his fascination
with ethnicity, sex, and authority; and
his inertial view of historical process.
Much as Freud labored to normalize the
idea of sexuality, so Freyre sought
to legitimize Iberian culture in the
tropics. In stark contrast, The Colonial
Background of Modern Brazil of Caio
Prado Júnior in 1942 (preceded by an
essay of 1933 giving a materialist
interpretation of Brazil's political
evolution) dismissed any nostalgia for
cultural roots in rendering Brazil's past as
a function of production, distribution,
and consumption. Adopting a propulsive
rather than Freyre's entropic view of
history, Caio Prado explained change as a
resultant of the international division of
labor and the role played therein by
stronger countries. Prado's pioneer work
would bolster the economistic argument
twenty years later but, for the moment,
offered little help for the identity quest
because he disregarded cultural destinies
and world outlooks.
In the third book, Roots of Brazil (1936),
Sérgio Buarque de Holanda proposed a
dialectical version of Brazilian history
rooted in dyadic constructs of Weberian
inspiration. His master split emerged as
that between the affective and diffuse
ties among persons in Brazil and the
juridical assumptions of Western
liberalism with its amoral balancing of
private egotisms (Cf. Da Matta's analysis
referred to above). While affect, or
cordiality, is therapy for rationalization
and depersonalization, it loses force
beyond a small human circle; it cannot
cement extended forms of social
organization, nor is it a reliable source
of normative principles.
For all their differences, the writers
considered thus far addressed national
reality by assuming a relation of tension
between the Iberian legacy and the West
at large. From this traffic between
localism and universalim, new identities
were to be forged. In the exchange,
however, Latin America suffers handicaps:
first, the mother countries could not
endow their colonies with modern
institutions and ideologies; second,
contemporary Latin America remains
traumatized (except in Freyre's view) by
the predatory violence of European
conquest and settlement. Yet to achieve
identity would seem to require assuming
at the outset that one finds oneself to be
at a viable center.
In Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and
Sugar (1940), Fernando Ortiz dispenses,
except by implication, with history
conceived as political and cultural invasion
of an exotic periphery. Instead, he
features two agricultural crops that
define the native landscape of every
Cuban. He starts with Cuban reality
rather than working his way toward it.
In this he is close to the lesson of São
Paulo's Brazilwood and Anthropophagy
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manifestoes. He deduces his story from
the biotic requirements of two forms
of vegetation. Tobacco and sugar are
defined not as currency in capitalist
exchange but as products of Cuban soil
that in themselves dictate institutional
arrangements and ways of life. Ortiz
starts with the land and its fruits (as did
the early Marx and Engels in The German
Ideology), not with human contrivances,
and adopts the ludic and poetic attitude
of the Modernists. Only after he
personifies his two crops does he smuggle
in the instrumental concerns of history
(markets, economic organization,
production systems), now subordinated
to preexisting Cuban identity that Ortiz,
the ethnologist, accepts with humor,
assurance, and an eye to common-sense
therapy.
The next step beyond the experimentalism
and expressive release of the Modernists
and the reconnoitering of the essayists
was toward precision, consistency, and
hemispheric generalization. A promising
locus by the 1940s was Mexico, whose
Revolution had sunk roots, matured,
and, it seemed, translated the disparate
hopes of the 1920s into a program of
domestic cultural inspiration. Political
and economic developments that have
cast doubt on whether a revolution did
in fact occur still lay ahead. Two further
factors enhanced the Mexican position.
First, the Revolution was premature for
true Modernists to have become guides.
Older hands retained intellectual
mentorship (Alfonso Reyes, Antonio
Caso, José Vasconcelos) and could
adapt to new situations within the large
philosophic perspectives of an earlier
period. Second was the exodus of Spanish
intellectuals to Mexico in the 1930s12.
They came with professional,
international-level competence in the
arts, letters, and sciences. Their
anti-dictatorial politics placed them to
re-legitimize the central Iberian
component of Spanish American culture
that had been so problematical since
independence. As Europeans, moreover,
they could expand the question of New
World identity to its hemispheric
dimension.
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This moment of the twentieth-century
prise was marked by the ascendancy of
existentialism and phenomenology,
diffused directly from France and
Germany or via Ortega y Gasset and the
Revista de Occidente. Although Spanish
emigres in Mexico gave anchorage and
inspiration for what Miró Quesada calls
the awakening of the Latin American
philosophic "project", the movement
was polycentric (MIRÓ QUESADA,
1974)13. In Argentina, for example,
Francisco Romero was the complement
to José Gaos in Mexico. Latin American
philosophers, no longer mere
"pensadores", were now less hostage to
circumstance and more confident in
managing generality. Even Ortega's
homily "l am my self and my
circumstance" leads, epistemologically,
from the general to the particular, not
vice versa. Phenomenology echoed the
pretensions of Catholic thought to
universalism and self-legitimation. It
could also claim the scientific rigor of
positivism without relegating Latin
America to an inferior stage of
evolution. Finally, as Mannheim
recognized, its historicism was congenial
to the search for collective identity; it
therefore provided a level of generalization
appropriate for the vague but persistent
notion of a Latin America civilization
(MANNHEIM, 1929, p. 296-300).
In the late 1950s our story line splits
into two halves, scientific and literary,
under pressures both domestic and
external. The professional schools that
for generations had validated the status
and careers of upper-class sons were
ill-suited nurseries for the cadres needed
to expand bureaucracies and private
enterprise at a time when economic
development was being internalized.
The remedy was to create faculties of
administration and social science on an
emergency schedule. Earlier, a few
institutions (University of São Paulo,
El Colegio de México) had attempted to
adapt curricula to domestic society and
culture. But the perceived need to apply
science to human affairs was now so
urgent and the funding for academic
infrastructure so abundant that there
was little time for judicious redesigning
of foreign curricular models, much less
for creative innovation in situ.
The apparent paradox was that the North
Americanization of universities (with
generous European and domestic accents,
to be sure) occurred precisely when large
sectors of the new academic
establishment were drawn to one or
another brand of activist or intellectual
Marxism — or else simply to the idea of
Marxism. After its transplantation in the
revisionist version of Juan B. Justo and
the "indigenous" version of Mariátegui,
Marxism had fallen into eclipse as a
result of disenchantment with Stalinism
in the 1930s, the Allied war against
fascism in the 40s, and the
developmentalist hopes of the 50s. Apart
from the party apparatus, only a few
intellectual stalwarts like Caio Prado
Júnior and Animal Ponce, along with the
Cuban journal Dialéctica, kept alive its
intellectual promise. Suddenly, with the
economic polarization of national
societies, the collapse of
developmentalism, the loss of faith in the
"benevolence" of international capitalism,
and the stirring example of a "fresh
start" in Cuba, Marxism regained its
initiative.
The joint hegemony of North American
methods and Marxist interpretations in
the social sciences was paradoxical but
not illogical. For, as we have suggested,
Marxism did not represent an epistemic
break with Ricardian economics but was
its logical culmination. Both Anglo
American empiricism and Marxian
scientism strive to unmask a social
reality that is more concrete and definitive
than the realidad evoked by the
pensadores, which had a Hegelian
promissory cast to it. Both array branches
of inquiry on a hard-to-soft scale, or
from infrastructure to superstructure.
Because the pensadores had implicity
upended this hierarchy, the new
scientists found them soft and subjective.
There is no mystery, then, to the fluent
academic traffic between empiricists
and Marxists, for while their politics
are poles apart, their ideologies, in
Dumont's comprehensive meaning, are
13
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similar. However much their therapies
differ, both accept the vision of a Latin
America that is host to implacable
capitalist structures reaching to the
taproots of society, and both fix upon
highly instrumental goals.
For an ideological alternative to
scientism we look to a fifth moment of
the ongoing prise that is concurrent with
the fourth. I refer to literary and artistic
creation, although to retain focus I limit
myself to the marvelous realism of the
novelists. We must accept the fact that
since the 1960s Carpentier and Garcia
Márquez have become more recognized in
the West at large than have Pablo
González Casanova and Fernando
Henrique Cardoso. One therefore assumes
their messages to be of comparable
significance. The challenge is to imagine
what transaction might occur between
novelists and scientists.
In the last century the debt that Marx
and Engels owed to Balzac and Dickens
was self-confessed; without the novelists'
sweeping social panoramas, the scientists'
understanding of commodification and
reification in bourgeois, consumerist
Europe would have been greatly
impoverished. But what has the Latin
American scientist made of One Hundred
Years of Solitude, beyond cherishing it as
a monument to domestic imagination?
The fact is that even a Marxist finds more
useful evidence in treatises of the Chicago
Boys than in the literary creations of his
compatriots. Let me venture an
explanation. The ideological split that
has characterized Latin American
intellectual endeavor since ca. 1760 has
finally become public. The keenest
sensibilities of the past were quite aware
of it as were, for example, Machado de
Assis and Mariátegui in their different
fashions. But now, at the present impasse,
bifocality has become pathological and
requires optometrical correction.
Simply stated, the issue is this. The
scientists, whatever the provisos and
nuances of their analyses, rationally
perceive Latin America as inserted into
explicable schemes of metropolitan
domination, manipulation, and
desacralization14. The marvelous
realists on the other hand, however
leftist their political sympathies,
instinctively "marvel at" the
intransigent resistance of their
societies to the imperatives of Western
rationalism, capitalism, and political
management. How do we bridge these
two apparently antithetical visions?
The very fact that the dialectic has
become simultaneous rather than, as
in our version of it since the 1920s,
linear suggests finally the possibility,
the multiple possibilities, for historical
engagement — if not, in any simple
sense, for synthesis.
This is not he place for an exegesis of
marvelous realism, for book-length
treatments of the term are already in
place 15. Suffice it to distinguish
between magic realism — which blends
magic into the world and creates
ambivalence for causal interpretation —
and marvelous realism — which blends
the unaccustomed (lo insólito) into the
workaday world, making the marvelous
conterminous with reality without
eliciting dread or portentous mystery
and without necessarily laying causal
process under direct question.
How then do we connect the
marvelous/magic realism of the literati
with the neopositivism of empiricists,
Marxists, and dependency theorists?
And how do we explain that the
novelists are more compelling than
even the most agile and innovative
of the scientists? Foucault gives us
clues if we are at home in the rarefied
air of French post-structuralism. But if
we wish to pluck the fruit of
understanding from our own garden,
we consult those who are placed to
make transactions at mid-point on the
priapic scale of hard-to-soft specialists,
namely anthropologists and historians.
For an ideological
alternative to scientism
we look to a fifth
moment of the ongoing
prise that is concurrent
with the fourth. I refer
to literary and artistic
creation, although to
retain focus I limit
myself to the marvelous
realism of the novelists.
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Historians, alas, have temporarily
disqualified themselves as they fight the
taint of humanism, deluging us with
more charts and tables than even
economists need. But the anthropologist,
more secure in his scientific standing,
risks speculative ventures.
The Brazilian anthropologist, we saw,
finds his society to be one of multiple
ethics. His culture confronts the
scientific premises of Western thought
with a seduced truth of African
inspiration which, because it is symbolic,
is also reversible. Thus the Western axiom
that exchange creates surplus, and from
it linear accumulation, may yield to the
presumption that exchange is reciprocal
and therefore requires restitution.
Afro-derived culture is not grounded in
universal truth but in a seductive truth
that toys with appearances and suspends
universais as it seeks emancipation from
sense and logic. The solemn resurrexit
sicut dixit of the colonial prayer has
become for the people Reco-Reco Chico
disse. Once it is ritualized truth is
relativized, purged of univocal, doctrinal
meaning. Brazil's terreiros, or ritual arenas,
become radiating centers that expose
reversibilities of the global society
(SODRÉ, 1983). Similarly in Spanish
America, Colombian peasants and
Bolivian tin miners, instead of
surrendering abjectly to the commodity
fetishism and human degradation of
capitalism, resist the laws of economics
by anthropomorphizing their domination
in the form of contracts with the devil.
In so doing, they reenact the first
historical moment of subjection or
enslavement to ressurrect a demonic
figure who will thwart rationalization
and dehumanization (TAUSSIG, 1980).
If the boundary between rationalization
and enchantment were to coincide with
a horizontal split between privileged and
desinherited classes, we might assume
that rationalization will continue a
downward invasion through the social
levels to produce a society that is
available for massage or cooptation by
a hegemonic ideology. But such is not
the case. The Brazilian studies show that
Umbanda cult organization, far from
respecting class divisions, cuts athwart
them and extends informal structures to
the highest political and military levels
(BROWN, 1979, p. 270-304). We have
also the evidence of the novelists of the
1970s who pursued to insólito not in the
domain of the populace but in the
careers of the caudillos who governed
them and who confronted, in marvelous
ways, the intrusions of Western
imperialism (ECHEVARRÍA, 1980,
p. 205-28/MARTIN, 1982, p. 207-27).
The intellectual moments just sketched,
while far from exhaustive, suffice to
indicate, first, why and how the
hard-soft construction of experience
might bend toward one that lends
philosophy, arts, letters, and religion
a contextual role for scientific and
policy-specific endeavor; and second,
that the unfolding of sensibility has
not been a linear but a multicyclical
process to be apprehended simultaneously.
The interactions, whether actual or
imaginable, are endless. Because the last
two of our moments, science and
marvelous realism, both became public
moments in the 1960s, strategic roles
were created for minds of ambidextrous
vocation such as pholosophers,
anthropologists, a poet-pensador
(Octavio Paz), a poet-economist (Gabriel
Zaid), or a literary critic-sociologist
(Antonio Cândido). For being more
closely engaged, the dialectic now
carries us forward more swiftly while
allowing, indeed requiring, recovery of
Modernism, the identity essay, and
Orteguian perspectivism. The respective
authors are recovered, however, not as
precursors but as participants. Their
messages enter a forum for cumulative
discourse.
Rediscovering the People
We seem to have floated to an ionosphere
of words, images, and conjecture. But as
recent centuries have increasingly
distanced thought from its object
(Cf. Cassirer's An Essay on Man), the
acrobatics it performs to achieve
rapprochement need not alarm us. In
Latin America, where the organizational
mind has not managed to impose itself
on the general will, we must welcome a
few verbal and conceptual calisthenics
if we are to recover a reality that
empiricism and Marxism do as much
to disguise as to disclose.
What I have merely hinted at thus far
is that Latin America's intellectual efforts
since the 1920s (plot them as you will)
aim toward discovering the people.
Earlier Europeans knew this to be the
starting point; but since people were
not yet visible (history written from the
bottom has come three centuries too
late) they had to conjure up a presocial
condition and then restage a presumed
social contract — unless, like More and
Montaigne, they started with the Tupi
Indians. In this case they found that
men are by nature natural, which
Oswald de Andrade maliciously
rediscovered with Anthropophagy. Locke
was lucky enough to stumble on a
definiton of people that seemed to
recognize natural propensities yet
afforded Western history a new point of
traction. For Latin America such a
definition is more challenging, first
because the people are culturally diverse
and socially segmented; second because
the founding principles of Ibero-Catholic
governance were shrewdly oriented to
accommodate heterogeneity; and third
because the motif of politics has for five
centuries been social control rather than
participation. Hence the obstacles to a
hegemonic ideology that requires
uncoerced assent to self-evident principles
rather than evasive acquiescence in
structures of authority.
Let us probe further into our ideological
puzzle. One might make the case that
the lot of the Latin American common
man has scarcely improved since colonial
times, perhaps even worsened. Without
devising economic or psychic indices to
prove the presumption, let us review the
public agenda of the region which after
two centuries remains largely unfulfilled:
abolition of "servitude"; minimum welfare
standards; republican institutions;
universal political participation;
intemalization of technological
innovation; domestic capital
accumulation; safeguards against foreign
manipulation and intervention. Latin
America might seem to be in permanent
stasis were it not that the new
historiography discovers, for every
century since the sixteenth, unceasing
transition from caste to class, from
personal to commercialized human
relations. This neo-evolutionary view
suggests that fresh ideology should be
forged in reaction to—and therefore on
terms dictated by—impinging capitalism.
But if an already "Western" agenda is so
largely unachieved, why does the
ideology from which it sprang seem
eternally appropriate? Need we interpret
Latin America "stasis" to represent sheer
ineptitude for modernization, or does
it betoken an intransigent historical
identity with psychic resources more
durable than even those of "hegemonic"
nations? Is there a tacit ideology of
resistance or, in a term that has regained
currency, primal liberation that should
be set against the Manchester agenda of
peace, prosperity, and private indulgence?
Is ideology inevitably "surppressive and
lacunar," as in Chaui's description, or
might it be premissive and pluralist? Can
we, that is, start with a matrix or "grid
of consciousness" as Dumont counsels,
or must we accept only the modular units
for a prefab house — the "agenda" outlined
above - whose design was lost in
shipment?
To imply, as 1 earlier have, that ideology
in Latin America is in search of a social
contract is a way of saying that it needs a
temporal benchmark, whether historical
or mythical. To constitute a polity is to
enter history, and it is appropriation of
history that bedevils the proto-ideologists
whom we have considered. Brazilian
Modernists prescribed symbolic
reenactment of the Indians'
anthropophagy, a ritual ingestion of
foreigners and their powers. Essayists and
neo-naturalist novelists found that
noncumulative history is immersed in
prehistoric geography. Ontologists asked
whether Europeans truly discovered the
New World or whether America is still
being invented. Marvelous realists imagine
a circular time that merges myth with
present circumstance. All this makes one
suppose that natural, precontractarian
man still inhabits Latin America. Where
can he be found?
Far be it from me to reinvent a creature
who frequents the pages of Guimarães
Rosa, García Márquez, and Roa Bastos.
Instead with the help of the
poet-economist Gabriel Zaid, let us make
clear that he is not homo aequalis or
economicus who arose with the Western
revolution of values (ZAID, 1979). I
choose Zaid simply because he can manage
statistics while looking past them. He
takes us to Mexico, but with queries that
make the case emblematic.
Zaid's theme is "unproductive progress ",
and his master construct is a
"pyramided" society that offers one third
of the population shelter under the
pyramids. Like Octavio Paz, Zaid evokes
Aztec imagery, in search not of historical
continuities but of Foucaldian recurrent
discourse. His emphasis seems apt for
segmented Indo-American societies from
Mexico to Bolivia. Comparable treatment
of the Afro-American tier of societies
from the Antilles to Brazil might give
more play to an informal ethic of
accommodation between common folk
and the public powers. (The
Euro-American societies of the southern
cone, which entered blockaded situations
in the twentieth century, lack the
ethno-ideological pluralism of Indo —
and Afro-America. It may be significant
that the latter societies have been
receptive to the praxis of Liberation
Theology, while Argentine intellectuals
were driven in the early 1970s to the
more fully conceptualized premises of
Liberation Philosophy.)
Zaid takes Mexico as a society unto
itself. After all, if a nation of seventy-five
million souls has, during a century and
a half, been painfully forged so that
nearly all its people have at least a sense
of belonging — if not of incorporation or
participation - it would be cynical to
insist that sovereignty is passe and that a
"peripheral" nation is merely a puppet
of external commercial and financial
manipulations that even a Harvard or
Sorbonne graduate student can scarcely
unravel. A large national unit is still
sovereign, and it can at any moment
stop importing whiskey or Stanford
educational advisors. More important,
if it is a country with a limited home
market, it can resolve not to satisfy
insatiable needs à la Ricardo (production)
but to provide would-be consumers with
inexpensive means to satisfy their own
modest and immediate wants. That is,
ideology — whatever its universal
attunements may be — is here to spring
from an ancient community, cast in an
idiom of self-recognition as well as
norms and aspirations. It should not
primarily react to systemic domination,
for the society itself is not systemic
but architechtonic (or pyramided). A
people who make no consistent political
contribution and provide a marginal and
erratic market for products that the
state incurs huge debts for producing is
systemic in only a Pickwickian sense,
The canonical explanation that dominant
classes control the pyramid of the state
and the semi-autonomous pyramids of
business, labor unions, universities, et al.
collapses into the tautology that groups
of wealth and power tend to be
dominateurs and not domines. Hegel's
analysis of the master-slave relation was
more subtle, but Marx slyly stood Hegel
on his head precisely to give his own
argument an evolutionary, systemic
outcome. Zaid attributes less to the feral
instincts of dominateurs or the greed of
international capitalism and more to
blind acceptance of a systemic economics
purveyed by progressive consultants. In
the years 1970-76, when the caloric
consumption of Mexicans decreased by
5%, the budget of the National University
rose by 600% and those of the provincial
universities by 1,400%. One implication
of this phenomenon is that the mere
presence of the non-pyramided
population feeds the growth of the
pyramids. That is, a destitute village,
simply by existing, creates a need for
anthropologists, bankers, contractors,
et al. The notion of distributing tax
revenues directly to the people is
ridiculed in light of the rural idiocy of
folk who assume debts at 100% interest
to buy plows and fertilizer which they
know they must slave to repay. The
pyramidal norm is an 8% loan, arranged
through connections, for a trip to Miami
or an extra car or a house which is
endlessly pyramided through further
connections. In this fashion the iron
rationality of the dismal science is
transmogrified into the euphoric credo
of triumphalism. The pharaonic
persuasion of course requires elaborate
casuistry in the form of such axioms as:
1) that constructing an immense urban
cloverleaf to save bureaucrats ten
minutes' commuting to
non-productive jobs is a better
investment that fifty thousand
bicycles for rural villagers; or
2) that chronic shortages of domestic
food staples are less significant than
the permanent availability of J&B
whiskey, LP's (Vivaldi and rock), color
TV. VW's, and vernacular translations
of Lenin and Milton Friedman; or
3) that direct family remittances from
migrants in Tucson and Los Angeles
are less effectively spent than
inter-governmental grants filtered
through two national bureaucracies; or
4) that the target consumers for an
industrializing country in Latin
America should be the elites off
Guatemala and Bolivia and not its
own impoverished citizens. Merely to
authenticate such propositions requires
substantial overhead in fees to
consul tants from prestigious foreign
universit ies.
Had Zaid composed his book in the
economist's usual fashion — a text
clut tered with statistics occasionally
relieved by an anecdotal footnote — his
would have been another dismissable
exercise in pathology. Instead he relegates
statistics to a formidable appendix and
raises anecedotes to the main text, where
they assume biblical force.The
"illustration" that compares the indigent
potter's six sons, who work hard from
childhood and marry only when they can
afford it. with the economist's six sons,
who marry and acquire children's tuition
bills and mortgaged cars and houses long
before parasitic jobs in the pyramids are
created for them, becomes a parable.
Parables that illuminate moral dilemmas
of time and place are or should be the
essence of ideology, which we refuse to
define as a grand blueprint, a mass opiate,
a brave new truth of science, or verbal
fetishism. The poverty of ideology in
official Latin America is revealed when we
contrast the economist, who preaches
high-tech production of consumer
durables (e.g., robots for São Paulo's
Ford factories) that will substitute scarce
capital for abundant labor, with the
politician, who dreams of coopting the
potentially articulate population into
laddered, non-productive employment
with the promise of cars, university
education, and bypass surgery. Small
wonder that the hard end of the
knowledge spectrum has become hard
like a gallstone, not like a cutting
diamond.
A Rogue Philosopher Lands a Hand
Clearly the game of blindman's buff is
ending. Deep change lies close ahead:
not the arbitrary structural change
promised by technocrats or revolutionaries
in the 1960s nor a grand turnover in
values but simple recognition of the
long-term facts of the case. For guidance,
we might stretch our antenna toward
those distant transmitters. Three obvious
sources of ideological inspiration are the
Iberians from Vitoria to Suárez, the
British from Hobbes to Smith and
beyond, and the Germans from Fichte
to Hegel to Marx. The Iberian tradi t ion
is the native one. I ts formal principle
that political norms are anterior and
external to the society has become
archaic, and therefore its informal and
still vital principle of populism (in the
historian's sense, not the sociologist's)
needs restatement in fresh context. The
British principle (with its French
Enlightenment corollary) represents
precisely the Western revolution of
values that, we finally recognize after two
centuries, Latin American submits to in
highly eclectic fashion. The central issue
is no longer to internalize rationalization
but to acknowledge permanent antibodies.
The German principle is more congenial
than the Anglo-French, for it arose in a
recognized context of underdevelopmeni
and directly challenged Enliglitened
tenets of Panglossian rationalism and
oligarchic meliorism. As it matured,
however, its apodictic universalism
proved inhospitable to a plural ethic.
For various reasons we may be dissatisfied
with these clusters of discourse. Despite
their internal contradictions and points
of dispute, they are general outlooks
that accommodate to situations crees;
they coast on premises that gradually
escape surveillance. Our preferred guide
would be an outcast, a rogue philosopher
The Iberian tradition
is the native one. Its
formal principle that
political norms are
anterior and external
to the society has
become archaic, and
therefore its informal
and still vital principle
of populism (in the
historian's sense, not
the sociologist's)
needs restatement in
fresh context.
who challenges vocabulary and premises
and not merely evidence, arguments, and
prescriptions — a thinker who escapes
the dead hand of a system by imposing
private experience in its complexity. We
surely have a choice of such rogues.
Merely for demonstration let us try
Rousseau. As a youthful pícaro in Italy,
Rousseau was exposed to the autumnal
season of a patrimonial, Catholic society.
In early maturity he collided with Paris
and the smug pansophism of the
philosophes. After he died, his alone of
French Enlightenment texts caught the
German imagination. Rousseau lived
out a Latin American experience and,
because all his writings are
autobiographical, they presumably
yield navigation markers. His points of
reference were picaresque Italy, the
philosophes' Paris that would soon deify
Reason, and an (idealized) Genevan
polis: all appropriate to our case16.
At the outset we dismiss the classroom
questions of whether Rousseau was
Jacobin or totalitarian (or both) or
whether the Social Contract is internally
self- consistent or whether the general
will is compatible with representative
government. We look for a grammar of
ideology, not formulae. As Peter Gay
has said, one should take Rousseau's
political theory as a critical instrument,
not a constructive device. Or: he is the
theorist of democratic movements, not
of the democratic state (CASSIRER,
1963, p. 27). However on interprets
the Social Contract, one is left with
the fact that when Rousseau addressed
cases—Geneva, Poland, Corsica—he
suspended a priori judgments and
weighed the historico-cultural facts of
the situation. Throughout his life he
held to the ideal of the polis as a
self-styled citizen of GenevaM; yet he
never suppressed memory of his
Catholic years in Italy as a periquillo
sarmento17 when he lived by his wits
and learned that one must judge the
self-given human being, that the fault
of society is its guilt and not its
organizational defects, and that a social
contract is needed not to create a
community but to give form to an
existing one. One need not recover an
archaic state of nature if society is
everywhere present. To capture that
society requires self-awareness, not
sociology; if, then, it is rooted in
persons, social thought should not,
cannot, be systematic. Rousseau's
professed metier in this period, and
throughout his life, was that of
musician, or one who deals in themes
and orchestration, not propositions
and systems. (Note the importance of
Brazilian popular music for ideology
in the 1960s and 70s.) (SANT'ANNA,
1978, p. 97-111, 223-42).
Let us group a few Rousseauian
reflections to bring out three themes:
the critique of liberalism, the principle
of non-individualism, and the general will
Rousseau's argument cut athwart the
liberal presumption of society as an
aggregation of self-made men divided into
colliding interest groups. This put the
stress on private liberties rather than on
liberty. It created false dichotomies
between minority rights and majority rule
liberty and order, liberty and equality,
self-reliance and paternalism. Freedom
begins with self and not with laws,
Rousseau believed, and the self should
submit not to laws devised by
philosophers but to the idea of law as
such. Where general interest is a
calculus by experts, common good
becomes a misnomer, for people no
longer share a common life. Shared
experience reduces to the capacity for
private response to an alien environment.
In Paris Rousseau was struck by the
evanescence of the old Roman and
Christian disposition for friendship,
amicitia. In the Nouvelle Héloise
Saint-Preux observes that a man may be
an instant "friend" on first meeting,
yet years later may become an instant
stranger if one asks of him a favor. A
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Parisian shows tender interest in so
many persons that he can have no real
interest in any of them.
Unlike the philosophes, Rousseau refused
to consider the state as an improvable
utilitarian machine for increasing
happiness and enhancing welfare. This
helps explain his attack on sciences and
arts in the first Discourse ("(. ..) tell us
what we must think of that crowd of
obscure writers and idle men of letters
who uselessly consume the substance of
the State") and allows us to presume
how he might have judged the academic
Gradgrinds and policy pundits who thrive
on our own public coffers. Personal
liberty was for Rousseau not a
mathematical but an ethical matter. One
had, fatalistically, to accept inequalites,
but not situations of control and
dependency. Transformation of the social
order required participation, not
techniques of management, consent to
law and not obedience to laws.
In denying that individualism was the
foremost social principle Rousseau did
not revert to Aristotelian and
neoscholastic political man, a creature
whose humanity pressupposed and was
defined by sociability. Once society is
constituted, however, men are, Rousseau
believed, indebted to one another and to
the state. Such indebtedness is not
dependence but describes a relational
community of artificial persons who are
not by nature sociable18. Freedom does
not therefore imply private spheres of
non-interference, which lead to
competitive disunity that causes one to
depend on another's will. The rights of
man cannot per se abolish coercion in
society, for, in Ellenburg's examples,
liberals are forever dispersing crowds,
busting trusts, and splintering mass
opinion. Moreover, to limit the quantity
of power is futile if the source of power
is tainted. If competition leads to
slavery, so too does hedonism, since
giving free rein to appetite is a form of
personal self-enslavement. The political
whole must be non-aggregative and
greater than the sum of its parts if it is
to make possible the foresight and
judgment that the presocial condition
denies. From this assumption the
question is not how to articulate parts
into a systemic whole but how to
respect the principle of diffuseness in
the body politic.
From all this it follows that Rousseau
distrusted the distinction between public
and private, for when liberty is relegated
to a private sphere, it is subject to public
encroachment. His master split is between
the general and the particular. All
groupings (family, occupation, class,
magistracy, and the like) are public but
particular associations that fall within
the general circumference of the state,
defined as a society of citizens. Instead
of the boundaries drawn (though often
preferentially suspended) in both liberal
and corporatist polities between
conflictive private and public entities or
sectors, we have here a hierarchical set of
loyalties that runs from the particular to
the general good, with the latter taking
precedence. This social ideal lessens the
importance of individualism, whether
seen as a cult of Romantic genius and
charismatic heroes or as a broad
pedagogical program for cultivating
latent abilities of single citizens. The
alternative, however, is not dreary
leveling and regimentation. It is simply
recognition that genius or mere
self-improvement is not a private matter
but the corollary to unfolding,
communally patterned social life. Genius
depends for its definiton on a shared
history.
Contemporary society was, in
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Rousseau's view, a legalized state of
war declared by a powerful minority
against the defenseless poor. For him,
then, the central concern was not social
engineering but the moral choice
between liberty and slavery. Of Marx
he might have said that he tried to eat
his cake and have it too, and of Bentham
that he ate a cake that wasn't his to eat.
As for Erich Fromm, Rousseau was
willing to dispense with the caviar of
freedom to if one had the rice and beans
of freedom from. Rousseau envisioned a
radically egalitarian society with negative
liberty for all, that is, with each being
free of the will of another. Inequality of
possessions is to be expected as long as it
is not so exaggerated as to allow sale and
purchase of persons. The more the gap
widens between rich and poor, however,
the more the rich abdicate responsibility
and weave the chains of oppresion with
garlands of art, literature, and science.
The much debated general will requires
recognition of society as mutual and
not devised or imposed association. For
example, what Taussig's Colombian
peasants demand is not fictitious equal
pay for equal work that feeds capitalist
expoliation but acknowledgment of the
intrinsic worth of all persons. Chauí
criticizes "release" of women from
home-making to the competitive labor
market because they continue to sustain
an exploitative system (CHAUÍ, 1983,
p. 112). Maria Hermínia de Almeida
generalizes the point in implying that
the primordial assignment for people
in a non-participatory polity is to
"bear witness", not to plead for an
advantaged mechanism of incorporation
(ALMEIDA, 1983). Ultimately general
will requires bonded fellowship and
reciprocal conditions of social life. In
this, it "forces people to be free". For
liberal pundits the phrase smacks of
totalitarianism. Ellenburg advises us to
reexamine the French, "forcer d'etre
libre", and to ask whether this means to
force or to strengthen, in Rousseau's
sense of virtue as a strengthening of the
soul. If the latter, we are left with
modern conscientization that resists
internalized domination, or hegemonic
ideology. Such resistance, one presumes,
is more easily mobilized in a society of
personalized status ascription (where
confrontations provoke Da Matta's
intimidating question "Do you know
whom you're speaking to?") than in
one where authority wields the scepter
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of egalitarian rationality (Chaui's
principle of Organization) with its
intimidating "who d'ya think you are?"
Let us now place Rousseau in the
context created by our having reviewed
Latin America's prise de conscience since
the 1920s and having taken Zaid's Mexico
as emblematic, though not descriptive, of
contemporary Latin America. In so doing
we look to Rousseau not for prescriptions
but for perspectives. We even create our
Rousseau as Suárez created an Aristotle
or British liberals created their Magna
Charta ex post facto. That is, modern
Latin America might discover him to be
a founding father in the sense of Borges
that a writer creates his own precursors.
Had Kafka not lived, we could not read
Browning as we do. Did Latin America
not exist, Rousseau's meanings would be
more obscure.
If we assume that Zaid's image of
Mexico has held for half a millennium
and that it won't be unfamiliar to our
great-grandchildren, we wonder whether
a program of economic development,
abolishing poverty à la Lyndon Johnson,
creating formal mechanisms for increased
political participation (and cooptation),
and schooling for selective release (and
cooptation) of individual talent—whether
such an agenda, rooted as it is in
heavily skewed political and economic
infrastructure, responds to the situation.
It would seem that we should start from
an integral vision of a somewhat passive
society rather than with a set of urgent
assurances of technocratic redemption
and dialectic movement. Rousseau was
not a Utopian, nor did he claim to have
discovered evolutionary process, natural
or man-made. He might, however, have
started with the premise that the total
population of a Latin American society
is already in the polity, that it needn't
await a signal from Milton Friedman or
the Marxists, nor the outcome of an
academic debate over marginality, to
determine who, by socio-politico-
economic indices, is in and who is out.
Mexico and Brazil and Paraguay and
Guatemala already belong to their
inhabitants. This assumption shifts the
focus from a Ricardo-Marxian emphasis
on mechanisms of change and
instruments of power to an acceptance
of fait accompli. This issue is not how
to change but how to acknowledge
what exists.
If we are to rescue the future from
politicians, vested interests, scientists,
and technocrats, we come up against
Rousseau's threatening general will. Does
this general will, we may ask, not open
the gate to totalitarianism, guided
populism, or, in the classic terms of
Madison's tenth Federalist paper, a
majoritarian "impulse of passion, or of
interest, adverse to the rights of other
citizens?" But these are manipulated
phenomena. Rousseau's general will
emanated from the people, not from
self-appointed managers and curators.
To be sure, the general will is
inconstant, because it depends neither
on verifiable principles of calculation
nor on hoary precepts of natural law. Yet,
if it is a direct emanation from the
people, we have less to fear from it in
pluralist societies such as the Latin
American than in a factionalized Western
society whose pluralism consists in
multiple interests that rest on shared
philosophic assumptions. Rousseau urges
us toward non-systemic situations, where
the task is to make the whole diffuse,
not vice versa as in the mimetic
centralist-federalist construction of Latin
American politics. Why, if multiple
realities are entertained, should political
discourse not reflect them? Rousseau
says nothing, as far as I know, that
precludes diverse interpretations of the
universe or that attributes universality
to Weberian disenchantment or that
denies the possibility of marvelous
realism.
Admittedly, Rousseau preferred small
societies to large ones. To the Cuba
of 1959 or the Nicaragua of 1979 he
might have wished to apply his Corsican
recipe for small nations of social
youthfulness adaptable for small farming
and amenable to moral in lieu of
commercial imperatives. Brazil or Mexico
more nearly answer his Polish case: a
large nation of soldiers and academies
that cultivates arts and sciences,
commerce and industry, where money
is made to circulate swiftly so as to
keep citizens in great dependence. This
was the perfect formula for a scheming,
avid, ambitious, servile, and knavish
people given to extremes of opulence and
misery, license and slavery. Rousseau's
advice for such a nation was to revive
the autonomy of provincial and smaller
territorial units. Lacking the ideal small
polity, one aims to segment the larger
whole in defiance of systemic articulation.
The representation one cultivates is not
delegated power that may enslave those
who delegate it but a direct and
continuing representing of the political
claims and world views of heterogeneous
constituencies in search of liberation.
In contemporary Latin America the
Christian base communities and
Liberation Theology are an obvious
analogue to the Rousseauian prescription.
Here religion assumes the public, civic
character that Rousseau advocated. By
assembling in primary groups the people
become the church, inverting and
decentralizing authority, eliminating the
paternal funcion of clerical "shepherds",
acquiring the right to speak directly to
the highest authorities. The constant
dialogue that sustains and justifies the
communities is a critical reflection on
self and society, a search for causes of
poverty and oppression that points
toward collective understanding and
ideology. Sin no longer means heterodox
beliet but any form of oppression. To
eliminate sin requires not a canvassing of
received doctrines but alertness to signs
of the times and a communal effort to
devise fresh language, ideas, projects.
Such a process seems closer to Rousseau's
notion of a general will in gestation than -
to Anglo-American suppositions about
opinion formation in a liberal society.
A Footnote on Multiple Ethics
This chapter has been concerned not
with immediate issues and practical
strategies but with the implications of a
long-term existential interlude that is
starting to witness, on many fronts, a
deep-cutting reconceptualization of
Latin American societies, institutions,
and their cultural premises. As I reached
.these final paragraphs, a letter arrived
from an accomplished Peruvian social
scientist and planner who writes:
"At this moment something more than
a preoccupation is apparent in the Latin
'American region. I would call it anguish
sprung from the sensation that our
distance from the industrial world and
leading-edge technologies is increasing
at biometric rhythms. On the other
hand there is a sense of loss of identity,
of dissolution of one's own, that
doesn 't mean transformation into an
'other' but into a vacuum marked by
frustration where the only conceivable
salvation is in the hands of economists
and financiers."
Yet it is precisely such an existential
moment — marked by anguish, vacuum,
frustration — that invites and compels
a surveying of native grounds and
cultural roots. And it now comes at a
time when the venerable Ibero Catholic
tradition can be remembered not as
exclusively clerical and authoritarian
but, like any long-lived tradition, as
carrying its own therapeutic potential.
This is not to say that the Christian base
communities just mentioned are in
themselves the answer (who knows what
forms of cooptation they lend themselves
to?), any more than the guerrillas,
squatters' invasions, and non-Catholic
cult groups that opened our eyes in the
1960s were the answer. (And who, after
all, can predict what burdens and ironies
are subsequent to any "liberation"?) The
point is that in the long run the
formation of radically egalitarian sects
against a pyramided church (à la
Troeltsch and Weber) offers a better
sociological example for Latin America
than the disquisitions of Madison, Mill,
Marx, and Gramsci.
This leads me to question Chauí's nimble
essay "Popular Culture and Religion",
which repudiates any and all religious
sects because they are cooptable by
institutionalized authority (CHAUÍ, 1982,
p. 71-83). My own inclination is to keep
religion right where Kierkegaard placed
it along with ethics, art, and science.
Chauí does, I admit, end up where I
would like to, with the Frankfurt School
admonition that science (not religion) is
the opiate of the people. But despite this
turn of the screw, her analysis is
embedded in received Western philosophy;
she urges use of its resources to replace
the suppressive, lacunar discourse of
"ideology" with an antidiscourse, or
critical discourse, that will unmask
Latin America societies
are societies of multiple
ethics, whereas the
ideology of the
industrial West
presumes a unitary
ethic or as Americans
like to put it, uniform
rules of the game.
ideology (CHAUÍ, 1980, p.22-3). The
objective at this exploratory, formative
moment, however, is not to calibrate
Western ideology against Western science
but to canvas coexistent modes of
discourse from wherever they may
arise. Rousseau, unlike his Enlightened
confreres, encouraged such an enterprise.
Here indeed is a central point. Latin
American societies are societies of
multiple ethics, whereas the ideology of
the industrial West presumes a unitary
ethic or, as Americans like to put it,
uniform rules of the game. Such rules
characterize egalitarian societies and are
conducive to dissemination of hegemonic
ideology. In Latin America heterodox
world views, notably (but not
exclusively) Amerindian and African ones
in their creolized form, still persist, And
they do so for two reasons. First, the
action of church and state for three
colonial centuries worked to orchestrate
and hierarchize diverse world views, not
to suppress or standardize them. Second,
in societies where large masses could
never realistically aspire to incorporation
within bourgeois society, it is natural that
heterodox outlooks and strategies for
reconceptualizing the social universe have
retained their force, How then can
ideology in the sense of universal political
ground rules flourish in societies that are
truly plural and not merely factionalized?
Let us take a elue from Chemoff's
contrast between Western and African
music, whole implications are conspicuous
for the Afro Caribbean countries and
Brazil (CHERNOFF, 1979). For the
moment, or perhaps for any moment
in our existential future, we cannot
expect clear, practical alternatives. What
we do require is sensitivity to simultaneous
constructions and rhythms. This we find
in Chernoff's comparison between the
Western "metronome sense", which
construes time as moving inexorably
toward a distant moment, and African
music, which imposes on musician and
spectator alike the need to maintain
a personal rhythm that gives coherence
to an ensemble of conflicting rhythms
and accents. Western music harmonizes
different tones into chords but has no
name for rhythms; its terminology
(accelerando, rubato, syncopation, and
so on) refers to speed, meter, and
accentuation. In Africa, beats have names
and variations, and the beat of music
comes from a relation among rhythms
rather than from a dominant pattern.
Alternatives remain alive. Translated
into sociopolitical terms, this is the
metaphor that illuminates our case. The
fact that the establishment may coopt
religious cult groups is of no more
consequence than that New York and
Paris night clubs convert African
rhythms to metronomic linearity for the
amusement of bored bourgeois patrons.
This aftherthought is by way of
underscoring what democratization
must mean in lands of cultural diversity
where economic "solutions",by norms
of the industrial West, are unattainable
in a foreseeable future. Here ideology
must evolve from the continuous
representing of the people's claims, not
from imposition via structures conceived
on high. Democracy must here be
thought of as a process that refers not
simply to the everlasting clash of
passions, interests, and opinions but also
to the premises from which they spring
and the arenas wherein they are voiced.
The path of liberation that Latin
Americans are adopting betokens a
processual goal and not the static
condition of Anglo-French liberty.
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